Regimi di accumulazione, democrazia e strutture di classe in Senegal [Accumulation regimes, Democracy and Class Structures in Senegal] by Oya, Carlos
Article for Afriche Orienti 
 
Reference: ‘Regimi di accumulazione, democrazia e struttura di classe in Senegal’ 
[Accumulation regimes, democracy and class structures in Senegal], Afriche e Orienti, VIII 
(3-4): 22-44, December 2006 
Accumulation Regimes, Democracy and Class 
Structures in Senegal 
 
Carlos Oya∗ 
 
Introduction 
 
Senegal has been often hailed as one of the rare examples of successful ‘democracy’ in Africa 
(Sub-Saharan Africa). This was already the case since a multiparty electoral system was 
peacefully established in the transition between Senghor’s and Diouf’s regimes in the late 
1970s. Senghor was the same Independence leader that had governed the country (1960-1981) 
in a one-party state system for a large part of his mandate (1966-1976) during the initial Post-
independence period (1960-1976). After the restoration of an unlimited multiparty system in 
1981, successful elections took place leaving the same party (PS) in place for various 
mandates in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, almost seventy parties are officially registered and 
contest in presidential and legislative elections (the next round will be February 2007). In fact, 
the praise of Senegalese ‘democracy’ reached its peak when A. Wade, the main opposition 
leader since 1976, and his party, the PDS, won the elections in 2000-2001. This electoral 
transfer of power, known as ‘alternance’ was quite exceptional for African politics and 
granted Senegal an image of ‘full-fledged electoral democracy’ (Gellar 2005). Indeed 
Africanist political scientists, especially from the ‘American’ schools, have devoted much 
attention to this phenomenon and the Senegalese exception (Cruise O’Brien 2003; Villalón 
1995; Gellar 2005; Boone 1992; Vengroff and Creevey 1997). 
 
Gellar describes the historical political evolution of Senegal as one “from predominantly 
aristocratic order toward a more democratic order” (Gellar 2005: 158). Gellar sees in 
Senegal’s evolution evidence of change that goes beyond the nature and functioning political 
institutions. He claims that there is evidence of change toward more social equality, local 
liberties, associational life and ethnic and religious tolerance. The last two are less contentious 
trends while the issue of social equality needs to be understood more clearly, since there is 
also evidence of accelerated social differentiation as a result of economic policy changes and 
a deterioration of the economic environment for a majority of rural people and a growing 
mass of urban ‘footloose labour’. By more social quality Gellar (2005) mainly refers to the 
gradual breakdown of monopoly over local power by a village male gerontocracy and the 
growing assertiveness of both women and youth. To an extent, the emergence of young 
people as an electoral force has had a significant effect on political outcomes as we will see 
below but this is one of many processes that have shaped the political economy of Senegal 
since Independence. 
 
While most of the evidence seems to suggest that a (liberal) bourgeois democracy has been 
established in Senegal since Independence, the literature also shows that this has not remained 
static and domestic politics has evolved in tune with other processes of social and economic 
change. Some of these significant processes include: the gradual deepening of capitalist 
development from the 1950s onwards; de-industrialisation and the strengthening of a ‘bazaar’ 
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economy since the 1980s; rapid urbanisation and concentration of higher-value economic 
activities around Dakar and the immediate hinterland; migration (internal and international), 
accelerated during the period of adjustment and liberalisation and encompassing a significant 
rural exodus; emergence/strengthening of different classes/social groups, changes in class 
formation and concomitant political factions; increasing dependence on external 
constituencies (aid agencies); liberalisation and changes in the perception of state roles; and 
stagnation in the agricultural sector and crisis of the ‘groundnut economy’ after institutional 
failures and the erratic liberalisation and deregulation of markets. 
 
This paper does not attempt to evaluate the ‘democratic’ experience of Senegal or to directly 
engage with the literature which has focused on the hybrid nature of Senegalese political 
system. The paper attempts to relate the political processes dealt with in much of the existing 
politics literature - clientelisation of politics, centralisation of power, followed by dispersion 
of power and more political liberalisation- with other processes of social and economic 
change concomitant to the uneven, deepening but incomplete development of capitalism in 
Senegal and the latter’s insertion in the global capitalist economy. The first section of the 
paper briefly presents a ‘basic history’ of evolving accumulation regimes, associated with 
capitalist development and its contradictions in Senegal as well as with the emerging class 
configurations that have been shaping Senegalese society since Independence. Then the 
following section addresses the debate on the nature of politics in Senegal and the frequent 
absence of ‘class’ as a category of analysis in much of this debate. This section looks at the 
complexities in class configurations, inherent contradictions within emerging and changing 
class configurations and the effects on the political settlement. The paper deliberately focuses 
on internal dynamics, which are often put on a subordinate plane in many analyses of Africa 
and Senegal in particular, but does not follow the usual polarization between ‘internalist’ and 
‘externalist’ explanations of African developments.1 Indeed, the role of foreign players, 
especially official donors, is not ignored in this discussion, particularly for their impact in the 
gradually shifting dominant accumulation regime in Senegal from 1980 onwards.  
Accumulation regimes and capitalism in Senegal 
 
The development of capitalism in Senegal has been mainly analysed from a Dependentista 
angle, if one takes the work of Amin (1969) as an example. This is especially because most of 
the emphasis was placed on the dominance of foreign capital in what was supposed to be the 
heart of the capitalist economy in Senegal, i.e. an oligopolistic manufacturing and to a lesser 
extent, mining sector. The collected volume edited by Cruise O’Brien (1979) provides some 
material in this respect, which shows ways in which France managed to negotiate or ‘impose’ 
a smooth transition from colonial dominance to political independence. In fact, it is often 
argued, the French had allowed a significant degree of political participation to Senegalese 
Africans but much less scope for African indigenous capitalism in the industrial sector and 
banking services (Freund 1998: 144). This meant that at the time of Independence entire sub-
sectors of the industrial, banking, construction and, in general, ‘capitalist’ sectors were in the 
hands of foreign capital. Moreover a new form of intermediate merchant capital class had also 
developed with the Syro-Lebanese minority, which controlled some segments of the 
manufacturing sector, tourism and a great deal of trading business before and after 
Independence. This reality led many scholars to see Senegal as a typical example of 
dysfunctional dependent capitalism in which a capitalist ‘enclave’ directly or indirectly 
dominated by foreign capital coexisted with a large mass of people, especially in rural areas, 
engaged in non capitalist forms of production. However, the reality is more complex and 
dynamic than that. 
 
For example, there is scarce secondary material to assess the extent to which capitalism has 
penetrated the rural areas in Senegal, to identify the forms taken by (proto) capitalist 
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tendencies and rural entrepreneurship and to examine the factors fettering a more rapid 
domination of agriculture by emerging capitalist or semi-capitalist farmers. This has been 
explained by the absence of a plantation system in the colonial period (from ‘below’ and 
‘above’), as happened in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya in the early periods of capitalist expansion 
(Rapley 1993; Leys 1994; Kitching 1980, Austin 1996).2 Some of the choices taken by the 
colonial administration in Senegal, like relying on petty peasant producers and marabouts for 
the creation of a ‘groundnut economy’ affected the particular way capitalist relations 
penetrated and were resisted (Markovitz 1970). As a result, while “pure forms” of capitalist 
development in farming have been limited to some agricultural sectors (tomato production, 
sugar (CSS) and some of the most successful horticultural producers/exporters on the Senegal 
river bank, the Niayes, the immediate hinterland around Dakar and the Casamance) the rest of 
farmers, far from being a mass of undifferentiated peasants, were historically affected by 
important dynamics of agrarian change, which include the emergence of (proto) capitalist 
farmers, development of casual labour markets and the rural exodus to urban areas and 
abroad. Meanwhile, French settlers restricted themselves to efforts to monopolise trade and to 
early manufacturing activities based in Dakar (Rapley 1993; Amin 1969; Cruise O’Brien R. 
1979)3. Thus, the bulk of the capitalist grande bourgeoisie in Senegal did not stem from 
farming but from trade, transport and industrial activities (Diop 1985). 
 
While the development of industrial capital was initially stifled by France’s metropolitan 
policies, after WWII a more inward strategy and the development of a home market for 
domestically produced goods began to be politically and economically feasible. 4  In the 
meantime, the ‘groundnut economy’ became the centre of the accumulation regime in the late 
colonial and immediate post-Independence periods. Groundnut production systematically 
increased at a rapid pace until the late 1960s, despite the slump provoked by WWII. 
According to most secondary sources, in Senegal, traders and middlemen and some African 
farmers were the main beneficiaries of the early expansion of the ‘groundnut economy’. 
These included the French petits blancs, who managed commercial houses, but also Lebanese 
migrants (traders and negociants) who took over many of the private trade channels in rural 
and urban areas after World War I, combining retail trade in consumer goods, purchasing 
groundnuts, and money-lending (Cruise O'Brien 1979; Klein 1979). Other venues of 
accumulation were facilitated by the import of consumer goods and especially rice from 
Indochina (now Thailand and Vietnam). At the same time, some African retail traders and 
large farmers were also able to gain from this process. The timid albeit decisive 
industrialisation process also accelerated the creation of an African urban working class. The 
expansion of recorded wage labour force was associated with transport, i.e. railways and road 
transport, and the incipient manufacturing industry in Dakar and Kaolack. The number of the 
enumerated employed increased from 23,000 in 1934 to 100,000 in 1958 and 125,000 in 1973 
(Sender and Smith 1986: 55).  
 
Industrialisation and agricultural modernisation continued with similar rhythm after 
Independence in 1960. Between the late colonial period and the 1960s there was in fact a 
remarkable degree of continuity in the accumulation regime, which had centred in the surplus 
extraction from the groundnut-economy. This accumulation regime was further strengthened 
and institutionalised with the establishment of several large rural development agencies of 
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which ONCAD was the most famous, for its wide outreach and the significant power it 
exerted on farmers, with the intermediation of rural notables and marabouts. The story of 
ONCAD and other rural development agencies during Senghor’s regime is frequently 
presented as one of clientelist patronage and mismanagement (Caswell 1984), but it is also 
one of vast transfers from and into the rural sector through different mechanisms: official 
prices, seasonal credit, input subsidies, rural infrastructure investments, subsidised transport, 
and extension services and research among others. The Agricultural Programme, to which 
these mechanisms were ascribed, did push modernisation in certain domains of agricultural 
production and had some significant effects on production and exchange relations. It also 
provided more venues of accumulation for the rural elites and small (proto) capitalist farmers, 
traders and transport entrepreneurs. Obviously, in the difficult contexts of drought and debt 
defaults, it also became a major drain of state resources, which would have devastating 
consequences in the late 1970s. However, all in all, the aggregate economic performance and 
especially that of incipient industrial sectors as well as agriculture (except for some 
exceptional years) was rather strong (Table 1).  
 
The government tried to affect the ownership structure of industrial capital, partly to 
accommodate growing demands of ‘Africanisation’ of industrial and financial capital from 
sectors of an incipient Senegalese educated bourgeoisie, and accelerate its ambitious plans of 
industrialisation by partly nationalising large industrial companies (SONACOS – groundnuts 
and vegetable oil- and ICS – phosphate and chemicals), whose plants and equipment 
remained foreign-owned. According to some accounts, the state created 70 parastatal 
corporations in the first half of the 1970s, which accounted for nearly 40% of value added in 
the ‘modern’ sector and employed a large proportion of ‘formal’ employees (Diouf 1993: 
247, citing Gellar’s work). This bold move happened, however, during a temporary 
favourable conjuncture (high international prices for phosphates and groundnuts) but just 
before the sources of surplus for the existing accumulation regime were exhausted. The 
demise of the colonial and post-Independence accumulation regime centred on the groundnut 
economy and state-driven industrialisation, began to take effect when the international 
conjuncture (groundnut and phosphate prices) and a new clientelist’s crisis erupted as the web 
of patronage relations within the bureaucratic and administrative system of state institutions 
(including parastatals) multiplied claims over rents, which reduced the control over 
clientelism that Senghor’s regime had painfully established since the 1960s. Senghor’s regime 
had to look for a diversified pool of funding, which eventually led to uncontrolled domestic 
and foreign indebtedness. Indeed, soon after that, the drive towards industrialisation was 
halted by the extensive financial and balance of payment crisis that the government faced in 
the late 1970s.  
 
In fact, a major failure of the regime was its incapacity to discipline domestic and foreign 
capital with any kind of performance criteria. Senghor’s bureaucracy was very ‘soft’ vis-à-vis 
national (including the Lebanese minority) and foreign capitalists who had benefited from 
various concessions and rents, which were financially costly for the state. Thus both French- 
and locally-owned enterprises, which benefited from rents, credit and subsidies from the state 
in the 1960s and 1970s, remained inefficient and avoided any risky long-term investment to 
increase capacity, invest in technological catching up and enhance competitiveness (Cruise 
O’Brien 1979). In reality the import-substituting and state-driven industrialisation experiment 
of the 1970s was short-lived because of a vicious interaction between worsening material 
conditions, growing contestation, increasing factionalism and low growth-enhancing 
governance capacities.5 
 
The story after the failure of this accumulation regime is well known. The Senegalese state 
was forced by the balance of payment and fiscal crisis to resort to external sources of funding 
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in a rather unfavourable moment, when the international financial institutions (IFIs) were 
aggressively promoting the establishment of liberal economic regimes through structural 
adjustment programmes and drastic packages of fiscal austerity. Indeed, over the period 1980-
99, i.e. the Diouf regime, Senegal was one of the countries in SSA with the highest number of 
adjustment loans, a total of 21, only below Ivory Coast and Ghana. Yet, per capita economic 
growth was virtually zero over this period (Easterly 2006: 59). This also shows how 
successful the Diouf regime was in negotiating access to foreign support amidst economic 
stagnation and growing political weakening. During the Diouf era (1981-2000) a 
‘technocratic’ state was being implanted on top of an increasingly fragmented political 
settlement, where past alliances started to crumble, particularly the historical support by the 
brotherhood hierarchies to the PS (Parti Socialiste), which waned until no more explicit 
electoral support was granted by the marabout oligarchs in the 1990s. Diouf’s regime had to 
negotiate an increasingly fragile accumulation regime by leaning to external pressures (aid 
agencies) and to a growingly complex and contradictory mix of internal claims, from the rural 
elites, brotherhoods’ leaders, the urban petty bourgeoisie traditionally allied to the PS, the 
new class of ‘informal urban entrepreneurs’, trade unions and political opposition.6 
 
The trends in the accumulation regime after 1980 can also be observed in terms of some 
important macroeconomic aggregates. Investment rates, as an indicator of the rate of capital 
accumulation, varied substantially between periods but between the mid 1970s and the early 
1990s, the speed of capital accumulation in terms of investment rates clearly slowed down. In 
the conditions of Senegal, investment rates below 15% could not create the necessary 
productive capacities to for growth-enhancing. Not surprisingly, 1976-1993 is a period of 
stagnation and decline in many aspects (see also Table 1).7 A weak correlation between 
domestic savings and investment also reflected the fact that capital accumulation was not 
generally driven by the savings of a domestic capitalist class (Figure 1). During the crisis of 
the late 1970s and 1980s, before austerity packages were implemented, the government 
absorbed the savings-investment gap with borrowing to incur unsustainable fiscal deficits, 
also swollen by the frequent debt defaults affecting rural development agencies. Stabilisation 
packages compressed consumption demand (including government consumption) and for 
some time brought domestic and investment savings closer. This, however, had the double 
effect of compressing investment to low levels (around 10-15%) and repressing consumption, 
which reinforced the stagnation of the 1980s. In the 1990s, precisely after the 1994 currency 
devaluation, foreign8 savings became the most significant force in allowing for a slight 
recovery of investment and the prospects for some faster capital accumulation (Figure 3).  
 
In all this period, the weakness and volatility of the accumulation regime was reflected in a 
stark evidence of little structural change. Only in the last 20 years, the crisis of the 
agricultural sector meant that other sectors like construction, services and utilities expanded 
their share of GDP, but the manufacturing sector rather than developing actually stagnated at 
least until the late 1990s. There was also little structural change in insertion in the global 
economy as the structure of exports changed very little between 1980 and 2004, mainly 
showing slightly more diversification and the collapse of groundnut-related products from the 
export bill, in favour of other traditional exports like fish, phosphate-related products 
(including fertilisers), cotton and petroleum-related re-exports (refined petroleum). ( 
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The experience since the late 1970s, and especially the apparent economic recovery of the last 
6 years,9 reflects the existence of some critical cushions on economic stagnation and lack of 
capitalist dynamism. One has been the capacity of the state to attract foreign savings, 
especially in the form of official aid. Another one, more recent, has been the management of 
the diaspora (itself an effect of the socio-economic crisis) and the impact of migrant 
remittances (Figure 2) on the living standards of households of different classes and also in 
aggregate terms, easing the foreign constraint that had limited the pace of capital 
accumulation in the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 2). These have partly compensated for the 
sharp shrinkage of the extractible surplus from rural areas, which had been an important 
element of the accumulation regime in 1950-1980. 10 
 
Nevertheless, a contradictory feature of the increasing availability of aid flows, associated 
with the agreements with the WB and the IMF, is that the neoliberal adjustment process 
reduced state capacities to induce increases in surplus and productive capacities, thereby 
squeezing future available resources for any bolder growth-enhancing policies. To a large 
extent, aid has been used to sustain the reorientation of the state, and its rent distribution, to a 
new (liberal) accumulation regime, and to pay for the stability of the political regime in times 
of crisis. Since the mid 1980s, as Boone (1992: 258) argues “the fragmentation and 
privatisation of state power…diminished the usefulness of the state as an instrument for 
implementing broad-gauged, long-term projects and strategies”. This meant having to 
accommodate ‘mercenary and disparate’ interests within dominant class coalitions, which 
straddle between a range of activities, often with short-term interests, that required often 
contradictory policy measures. These competing claims and the gradual shrinking of policy 
space as a result of agreements with international creditors and donors were significant 
drivers of policy incoherence and amounted to greater instability in the accumulation and 
political regime during the 1990s.11 In this context of increasing unpredictability and 
incoherence, import trade and domestic commerce gained in importance as centres of the 
accumulation regime in the 1990s. 
 
The changes experienced in the accumulation regime since the late 1970s amounted to a 
marked tendency towards a ‘bazaarisation’ and informalisation of the economy, i.e. to a 
growing importance, in terms of aggregate value added and especially of employment and 
livelihoods, of trade (import trade but especially local petty retail trade), services (to a 
significant extent in urban and peri-urban informal sectors), construction and transport, as 
central sites of accumulation. The seeming dynamism of fishing and chemicals in the late 
1990s finally proved to be short-lived in light of the current crisis affecting mostly local 
fishermen (and confirming the control over the fishing industry by joint ventures dominated 
by European capital to circumvent fishing right licenses) and the phosphate sector (with the 
near financial collapse of ICS, its flagship company). The crisis in rural-based activities and 
the concomitant rural exodus in the 1990s have underpinned and reinforced the above 
tendencies, also spurred by the distribution of migrant remittances, which have basically gone 
to current consumption of households and to nurture the construction boom and speculation in 
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real estate.12 These changes in the accumulation regime, partly driven by the ‘imposed’ 
liberalization of the economy, had significant political implications, as we will explain in the 
following section. 
Patrimonial politics and class relations 
 
Neo-Patrimonialism and the challenges of class analysis 
 
According to the most influential scholars, Senegalese politics is characterised by patrimonial 
networks, which are overwhelmingly dominated by “two fundamental institutions”: Sufi 
brotherhoods (especially Mourides) and the state.13 Cruise O’Brien contends that while the 
‘social contract’ in Senegal remains as an historic compromise between these two 
fundamental institutions, its is no longer a deal simply between government leaders and 
religious hierarchs (Cruise O’Brien 2003: 209). Beck (2002) considers that clientelism and 
patrimonial politics are essential features of Senegal’s political system insofar as access to 
state resources (rents and money) are the main objective of Senegal’s political class, the 
president controls a very large stake and the state remains a significant employer.14 Gellar, in 
his more recent contribution, also emphasises the persistence of patrimonialism and 
clientelism in Senegalese politics asserting that:  
 
“Senegalese political parties traditionally have regarded control of the 
presidency as the main stake in politics, access to state resources as the main 
spoils of victory, and positions as ministers and heads of state agencies as 
important sources of revenue for party leaders and their parties…while many 
ordinary citizens expect those in power to be generous in distributing state 
resources and offices to their families, friends, place of origin, and supporters” 
(Gellar 2005: 157) 
 
This portrait of Senegalese politics certainly reflects some essential elements of state-society 
relations in Senegal and patrimonialism and clientelism are well-documented phenomena. 
However, one problem is that this general description of Senegalese politics fails to clearly 
explain differences in economic performance and changes in the accumulation regime 
sketched in the previous section. Nor does it clearly offer an analytically convincing sequence 
of political evolution in Senegal. In many ways, Senegal’s experience reproduces elements of 
one of the ‘basic histories’ convincingly put forward by Allen (1995). In his account, Allen 
discusses evidence of the rise and fall of clientelist politics during the ‘managed’ 
decolonisation process in many Africa countries and how the ‘crisis of clientelism’, as a result 
of increasing factionalism and power struggles towards the early period after Independence 
led to changes in political regimes and the nature of politics. One of the solutions to the crisis 
was the ‘centralised bureaucratic politics’ which would include the following elements (Allen 
1995: 305): a controlled retention of clientelism as a mechanism of legitimacy and support 
mobilisation; the centralisation of power within the executive presidency, where the president 
should stay above and manipulate factional politics; the rise of a political-administrative 
bureaucracy replacing parties as sites of distribution and contestation of clientelist rents; the 
downgrading or more direct manipulation of representative institutions (parties, elections, 
parliament, local government, trade unions, cooperatives). The regimes that solved the 
clientelist crises with a centralised-bureaucratic option became generally stable, at least until 
the 1980s, when structural adjustment and economic crisis changed again the rules of the 
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game. To a large extent, Senghor’s regime in Senegal constituted one of such paths. The 
strengthening of the executive presidency power and Senghor’s success in managing factions 
backed by a constitutional rule that prevented a multi-party politics, were key to the stability 
of Senegal’s democracy in the first 20 years after Independence. Political liberalization 
became also possible after 1976, once Senghor was preparing the ground for a peaceful 
transition to his successor, Abdou Diouf, whose survival was also based on the maintenance 
of the key foundations of the ‘centralised bureaucratic’ regime, despite the serious fiscal and 
macroeconomic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Diop and Diouf (2002), 
one of the secrets of the survival of Diouf’s regime despite the odds (economic crisis, 
economic reforms, political pluralism) was the broadening of the ruling class and the space of 
cooptation, which would eventually mean a dispersion of state resources around various 
centres of power. More recently, A. Wade, who won as a result of the alliances of various 
constituencies against Diouf’s regime, has ended up strengthening the executive power of the 
presidency to the point of personalising public administration (Gellar 2005; Dahou and 
Foucher 2004; Diop 2004). This return to centralised bureaucratic politics with a strong 
presidency and a charismatic leader may well be a response by Wade and his entourage to the 
menace emerging from diverse power centres and to the lessons extracted from the second 
crisis of clientelism (in the 1990s) that eventually led people to vote Diouf and the PS out of 
office in 2000/01. 
 
In this historical sequence class matters, despite the fact that is seldom mentioned in the 
literature. Class configurations gradually changed and new groups and class factions became 
contestants to the process of resource distribution in the existing and evolving accumulation 
regimes. In order to transcend an analysis based on a descriptive account of patronage 
relations between state officials, political leaders and civil society constituencies (religious 
brotherhoods, ‘peasants’, urban businessmen, etc.), a class analysis may help in adding 
texture to the ‘patrimonialist’ descriptions and account for processes of social change that 
could have an effect on the way politics worked in the country. As Boone (1992) notes, 
“states are rooted in particular, historically configured social relations of power, production 
and surplus extraction” so an understanding of the social (class) character and origin of state 
power is necessary. This is partly what we briefly do in this section.15 
 
The empirical identification of classes is generally a complex exercise and remains a 
particularly serious challenge in analyses of African social formations that differ in some 
respects from the realities of advanced capitalist countries. One should avoid oversimplified 
class analyses, inspired by a relatively abstract and idealistic notion of the opposition between 
capitalists and proletarians, defined in terms of their relationship to means of production. This 
dichotomy is essential in theoretical terms, but it needs to be carefully operationalised in a 
specific context. One could accept the reduction of the concept of class in a Marxian sense as 
a ‘social grouping with a particular relationship to the means of production (a relationship 
which must be defined) in a specific mode of production (which must also be defined)’ 
(Forrest 2004: 96).16 In advanced capitalist contexts, forms of social stratification have been 
shown to be diverse and complex so that the identification of particular class positions and 
power relations remains a challenging empirical exercise.17 Class boundaries are not always 
unambiguous between common categories (small peasants, capitalist farmers, rich traders, 
etc.) and heterogeneity also exists within them (in terms of labour relation, economic 
dynamism, origins, livelihood diversification, etc.). Thus, overlaps and a complexity of class 
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impose a modified Marxian framework on a social context in which classes are in fact difficult to 
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locations, particularly among broad categories like ‘smallholders’ and ‘middle peasants’, may 
be very common indeed.18 
 
Social class formation and configurations in Senegal 
 
Unfortunately, there is very little work on social classes and class formation in Senegal, and 
the available material tends to focus on urban areas for obvious reasons. Indeed, efforts to 
identify and describe social classes in Senegal in general are not common.19 In a frequently 
cited study, Diop devises a classification of socio-professional categories, which are 
combined to conform to certain ‘Western’ types of social classification: grande, moyenne and 
petite bourgeoisie, on the one hand and proletariat and peasantry on the other hand. 
According to Diop, the bulk of the capitalist grande bourgeoisie, i.e. the dominant class 
together with the bureaucratic elite and the religious leaders (marabouts), did not stem from 
farming but from trade, transport and, partly, industrial activities, an opinion shared by other 
authors who emphasise the prominence of merchant capital in Senegalese society.20 This 
shows an important albeit partial picture of domestic class configurations. The main problem 
in this framework is that Diop considers the ‘peasantry’ as a distinct class, on the grounds that 
even in pre-colonial Wolof society the peasantry could be considered a solid ‘class’. This is 
why it is necessary to look into historical processes of rural class formation to shed some light 
on agrarian structures before summarising the general class configuration of contemporary 
Senegalese society (Oya 2004). 
 
Historically, like many other African societies, the territories of Senegal had a class society 
before colonial penetration, in which an aristocratic order tended to prevail, despite some 
regional differences (Diop 1985; Sender and Smith 1986: 37; Markovitz 1970). The initial 
conditions of inequality in local social structures, and particularly of Wolof society, together 
with the new opportunities provided by the monetisation of the economy, the expansion of 
trade and cash crop production, facilitated a process of growing differentiation and the 
phenomenon of labour migration (Copans 1980; Cruise O'Brien 1975; ; Markovitz 1970; 
Venema 1978: 24). In addition, the interventions of the colonial State consolidated 
differentiation and exploitation, albeit on a new basis (Gentili 1998: 267). The resulting 
dynamic of rural differentiation was a catalyst of the further expansion of cultivated area, 
through colonisation of new lands, and through the availability of more labourers, including 
the migrant navetanes (David 1980). These shifting class configurations underpinned the 
emergence of the ‘groundnut economy’ and provided some basis for further state intervention 
in its ‘modernisation’ project before and after Independence. Examples from Senegalese 
history include also elements of “capitalism from above” and “capitalism from below” as 
defined and emphasised by Lenin (1899) and Byres.21 However, judging from the results of 
my study carried out among large and middle-scale farmers in the Groundnut Basin (in 1997-
99), the development of forms of capitalism from below does appear to be widespread, 
though not pervasive, in the Groundnut Basin (Oya 2001). Thus, a differentiated rural 
population has gradually given rise to a class of farmer-entrepreneurs (kulaks), which could 
already be observed to a lesser extent during the late colonial period (Klein 1979), but that has 
otherwise disappear from the radar of most scholars interested in Senegal. Their origins are 
                                                     
18 Particularly elucidating in this respect is the chapter on classes and exploitation in Kitching 1980 pp. 
438—455. See also Bernstein 2000, p. 30. 
19 In much of this literature the concept itself of ‘class’ is not unproblematic. Different methods of 
classification have been followed by Diop 1985, Boone 1995, Thioub et al. 1998. These methods rely 
on alternative hypotheses on the determinants of class locations, ranging from caste origin in Diop 
1981, professional/occupational categories in Diop 1985, income quintiles, or belonging to ‘interest 
groups’ in Boone 1992, Thioub et al. 1998.  
20 Boone 1992. 
21 On these concepts see Byres (1996, chapter 2). 
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diverse, but they are not usually derived from a class of traditional landlords, aristocrats or 
religious leaders, the archetypal non-capitalist ruling class in rural areas.22  
 
Therefore, the ‘peasantry’ as a category of analysis in the rural Senegalese context, as in most 
other rural poor contexts, may not be as appropriate as often assumed. It conceals a more 
complex social fabric that includes, at one extreme, very poor (‘too poor to farm’) agricultural 
households, which contain many members of a class of ‘footloose’ labour, i.e. engaged in 
casual labour for others and in precarious forms of self-employment straddling rural and 
urban areas often ‘on the move’. At the other extreme, a class of farmers-traders-
entrepreneurs is discernible, which wields a significant degree of economic, social and 
political power where they live and beyond, if their connections reach political and 
administrative institutions (Oya 2001). Between these classes (with their differential status, 
power and interests), a rather differentiated group of petty commodity producers, traders, 
artisans and fishermen coexist.  
 
Another matter of debate is whether there is such a thing as a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ or 
whether the political elite can be considered a ‘ruling class’ in a Marxist sense (Forrest 2004). 
The fact that significant power is wielded by individuals with positions in the state apparatus 
does not presume a belonging to a form of ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Possession of 
private property, control over production processes and appropriation of surplus in the form 
of profits and rents do not seem to converge in the case of bureaucratic elites. It is true 
however, that many individuals with public office do come from bourgeois or proprietor 
backgrounds and straddle economic and political power by being at the same time a 
bourgeoisie in the classical sense and a bureaucratic elite. Some of the farmers-traders-
entrepreneurs mentioned above have access to state power through public office or mediating 
roles between the state and other constituencies. What comes first (economic accumulation or 
public office) is a matter of empirical investigation rather than premise. 
 
Another particular group, which can be considered part of the national (petty) bourgeoisie, is 
the Lebanese petty bourgeoisie, which historically adapted to changes in the accumulation 
regime and state policies. As a result of state policies directed to exert control over the 
‘groundnut economy’ and its surplus distribution in the 1960s and 1970s, Lebanese 
middlemen gradually positioned themselves from rural-based trading networks in which they 
had held local monopoly positions that provided venues of primitive accumulation, to various 
urban sectors, especially in wholesale and retail cloth trade and grocery chains, where they 
concentrated on maximising short term profits at low risk (Cruise O’Brien 1979). Some of the 
most successful accumulators within the Lebanese capitalist class reinvested in real estate, 
restaurants and entertainment, becoming rather dominant in the latter two sectors even today. 
 
Pari passu the evolution of accumulation regimes and both partly as a consequence and 
cause, new social class locations have been emerging since Independence, as a result of 
interplay of challenges, constraints, opportunities and historical conjunctures. From the 
discussion about processes of rural class formation above, and the results of some of the 
studies cited, we can characterise contemporary society in Senegal as a complex web of class 
formations and locations with shifting interests and various linkages to the state and the 
centres of the evolving accumulation regimes. A summary of this structure as a non 
exhaustive list of various ‘class locations’, which distinguish people in terms of their 
occupations, access to means of production, wealth, origins and location is presented below: 
 
1. Mainly rural-based classes 
a) Small-scale poorer farmers (often too poor to farm), frequently forced to have 
members of their households as ‘footloose’ labour in quest for casual and/or 
                                                     
22 See M. Diop (1985: 17-65) and Markovitz (1970) on different social origins in rural society and the 
formation of ruling élites within this social structure. 
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seasonal means of survival; many of the households can be characterised as 
essentially semi-proletarians and subject to significant seasonal variations in their 
welfare. 
b) Average small-scale peasant farmers, significantly integrated into the market 
economy through marketing boards (before) and private traders (now), as well as 
via linkages with capitalist companies; these peasant-farmers are usually food 
self-sufficient or do not suffer from significant seasonal variations in welfare as 
they may be involved in other dry-season income generating activities (normally 
petty trade or transport). 
c) Middle-to-large-scale (semi) capitalist farmers, with one foot in ‘traditional’ 
production relations and another in processes of gradual capitalist accumulation 
through straddling of economic activities and reinvestment in farming, trade and 
transport; some of them have become successful accumulators with significant 
economic and political power. 
d) Rural notables, some of them marabouts, with decision-making position at local 
and regional level (Rural Councils), mid-large-scale farms, easy mobilisation of 
labour through capitalist and non-capitalist relations and often involved in rural 
transport, trade and/or construction. This group is often overlapped with the one 
above (1.c). 
2. Predominantly urban-based class locations 
a) Urban working class (with rural connections), a heterogeneous group formed by 
two main sub-classes: 
 At the poorer end, poor young workers straddling activities between 
urban and rural areas (in rainy season) as casual workers, hawkers (bana-
bana) and/or apprentices; this is a rather amorphous and unorganised 
mass of ‘footloose’ semi-proletarians; this includes also a significant 
proportion of women in urban petty trade. 
 At the less poor end, traditional urban working class, with jobs in 
manufacturing and services (including public sector), usually ‘formal’ or 
organised although not necessarily trade union militants. Some 
individuals in this class may also have a foot in self-employment (trade, 
transport, other services) to complement earnings. This important class-
location would include a range of civil servants, like teachers, health 
workers, low and middle-level administrators among others. 
b) An urban-based wealthy grande bourgeoisie, made up of mainly: 
 Industrial capitalists with assets and decision-making power in the largest 
industrial companies (CSS, SONACOS, ICS, SONATEL, etc.), some 
with a foot in the state administration; 
 Financiers/financial capitalists, with assets and decision-making power in 
the banking sector and significant business connections abroad; 
 Diversified investors, with business interests across a range of activities, 
including entertainment, tourism, construction and manufacturing; some 
of these may include a sub-class of successful capitalists of Lebanese 
origin. 
c) Urban transport entrepreneurs, a growing group that has been nurtured by the 
effects of the agrarian crises on the venues of accumulation in rural areas; some 
of these include marabouts or people with power within the Islamic brotherhoods 
who have taken the road of investing in urban activities, of which transport has 
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become one of the most profitable;23 some of these entrepreneurs may be 
amongst the richest businessmen in the country.24 
                                                     
d) Import trade dealers and urban-based retail traders, with access to capital, many 
of whom have organised creating one of the most powerful lobbies in the country, 
UNACOIS. This ‘class’ of urbanised merchant capital, some of Lebanese origins, 
some with external links through the Senegalese diaspora in Europe and New 
York, many belonging to the Mouride brotherhood, have increased their political 
presence and power with the process of economic liberalization, accelerated since 
the 1990s.25  
e) Highly-skilled (often University-trained) urban-based professionals, workers and 
job seekers, some increasingly engaged in ‘professional services’ and particularly 
in the consultancy business. This class location of literati may also include some 
journalists and indeed academics. 
3. Cutting across rural-urban divides: 
a) Moodu-Moodu, or successful ‘transnational’ migrants with connections with local 
business and protagonists of the last wave of capital inflows into the country, 
which have maintained levels of consumption for part of Senegalese society and 
boosted some business, notably  the construction sector, which has been one of 
the drivers of growth in the past ten years.26 
b) High-level religious leaders/marabouts with positions of power within 
brotherhood hierarchies (especially Mourides). Although some do not explicitly 
engage in business or economic activities and live on the ‘centralised’ resources 
of the brotherhood establishment (via direct donations from followers), many 
have a foot in the business sector, traditionally in groundnut farming and over the 
last thirty years increasingly in urban activities, particularly transport.  
 
Mingled with this social fabric of groups and classes (some not yet ‘in themselves’ in terms of 
production relations and implicit/explicit interest conflict) appears a group of higher level 
bureaucrats, advisors, part of the so-called ‘political class’, often with a foot in the business 
sector through family or client links, who mediate links and venues accumulation between 
foreign donors, the state and domestic business (Beck 2002). In this sense, they can also be 
considered part of an urban bourgeoisie involved in business with high short-term profits and 
low risk activities. But, deliberately and in line with Forrest’s insights, we do not consider 
them as a ‘social class’ in its strict sense, although they may be part of one or more of the 
class locations mentioned above.  
 
Generally, rich rural notables and entrepreneurs, high-ranking marabouts, the grande 
bourgeoisie, wealthy import trade dealers, and the professional literati (many of which 
holding public office) constitute factions of the ruling elites, thus those with a strong grip on 
economic and political power, directly or indirectly. Within these classes, different factions 
can be identified with interests that may clash with one another, especially for example 
between industrial capitalists seeking market protection from the government (sugar, 
vegetable oil production, textiles, etc.) and wealthy traders, especially those involved in the 
import business who are strong advocates of trade liberalization and the removal of duties and 
barriers. As a result of frequent straddling of occupations, individuals within these class 
factions may well hold contradictory interests, like rural entrepreneurs with interests in 
farming, transport and rural trade, who may well defend different positions vis-à-vis 
23 See Copans (2000). In 1970 Markovitz (1970: 93) has already anticipated these phenomena, and 
noted ‘religious leaders…are not a traditional class in the sense of opposing innovation, change, or 
modernisation…they can best be understood as a conservative class’ in the sense of seeking to maintain 
their established positions of power. 
24 See also Marfaing and Sow (1999). 
25 See Thioub et al. (1998), Marfaing and Sow (1999) and Ebin (1992). 
26 See also Tall (1994), Dahour and Foucher (2004) and Ndiaye (1998). 
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agricultural policies and state regulation depending on the issue at stake and complicating the 
determinacy of interests and class locations. 
 
Accumulation regimes, class relations and political change 
 
The changes in accumulation regimes described before shaped the emergence of new classes 
(Moodu-Moodu, transport entrepreneurs, new urban and organised merchant capital) in ways 
that have affected the web of patronage relations often emphasised by most scholars. In this 
regard, Boone’s (1992) treatment of patrimonial politics within a class analytic framework is 
more convincing than standard accounts of clientelism and patrimonialism. Her basic 
argument is that the state chose to control commercial circuits to extract surplus and distribute 
resources and rents, which formed the material base for a ruling class constituted by rather 
disparate elements, factions and interests. The result was a lack of a coherent class-based 
project, which resulted in economic stagnation as a contradictory and unintended effect, 
which would eventually shrink the material base of the ruling class. While the ruling class, 
according to Boone, did not show signs of acting for itself, the Senegalese state did not 
emerge as a Bonapartist state intervening on its behalf.  
 
This has meant that none of the classes mentioned above has managed to control a large 
proportion of state-mediated resources or to clearly influence the direction of their 
distribution and the overall policy framework. Instead, various class factions with economic 
and political power have managed to influence more concrete policy decisions and measures 
at particular times. The state, permeated by factions coming from some of the classes 
mentioned above, has not been able either to control completely the emergence of new social 
factions and claims from old ones. At the same time, the grievance voiced actively and 
passively but other social groups (including for example the unemployed urban youth) also 
affected the social basis of political power and its viability. In a sense, the state in the 1980s 
was caught in an endlessly growing web of claims and power contestations and could not 
deliver accordingly. In fact, the lack of ‘autonomy’ of the state and its incapacity to create 
incentives and discipline capital is explained by Boone (1992: 263) in terms of the absence of 
a “social class with interest, collective need, or power to forge a state that was autonomous in 
these ways”. This would explain, she argues, the lack of capitalist development in Senegal. 
Instead, we argue that this failure can only partly account for the lack of a more dynamic and 
viable form of capitalist development in the long term. 
 
Arguably, the various centres of power, facilitated by the increasing diffusion of control over 
economic resources to include groups outside the influence of the state, are associated in 
complex ways with the three main sources and forms of power in Senegal, namely the state 
power, the religious and the donors’ power (Marfaing and Sow 1999: 233; Villalón 1995). 
Moreover, accelerated liberalization and privatization in the 1990s, encompassing a 
narrowing of the State’s economic control and prerogatives, also gave rise to additional 
independent centres of economic clout and power, which resulted in a further limitation of 
hegemonic controls (Thioub et al. 1998: 82).27 The liberalization and privatisation process has 
certainly opened new opportunities for primitive accumulation (for some) and for deepening 
business concentration (for others), in trade, transport, cereal and groundnut 
storage/marketing, telecommunications, construction and agro-processing, while maintaining 
part of the preferential treatment by state sponsored agencies. Nevertheless, these 
opportunities have often been erratic, and have exacerbated the short-termist approach of 
many domestic capitalists belonging to the wide merchant capital class. The crisis of the 
                                                     
27 The ascendance of UNACOIS and its growing militancy is given as an example of the new centres of 
power and lobbying. However, Thioub et al. argue that its internal pyramidal structure still reflect 
patronage links, personal loyalty and dependency (Thioub et al. 1999: 82). At the top of this pyramid, 
some of the grandes fortunes that emerged during the liberalization renforcée of the 1990s are strongly 
represented (Thioub et al. 1998: 75; Copans 2000: 30-31) 
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manufacturing sector has also hindered the privatisation process, which has been dominated, 
in the case of the best pieces of the cake (SONATEL, SONACOS, now ICS), by foreign 
capital. 
 
In addition, a diversion from production and industrialisation, especially during the process of 
structural adjustment, meant a deepening of dependence on a basic comparative advantage 
that was being eroded by the institutional failures in agriculture and agro-processing and the 
growing competition from the rest of the world. This effected and compounded growing 
urbanisation, informalisation, the increasing reliance on a precarious and ‘bazaar economy’ as 
a place of both bare day-to-day survival for many and substantial accumulation for few, 
which, compounded by the increasing loss of policy space by the state vis-à-vis international 
donors, have finally constituted determinant processes of political change in Senegal. Class 
reconfigurations and the exhaustion of a regime that eventually had little to offer to most 
powerful ruling class factions and the mass of disaffected urban youth and peasants on the 
brink of exodus, were consistent with a change that at least was to shake the foundations of 
the ‘social contract’ mentioned by Cruise O’Brien (2003). 
 
The exceptional electoral transfer of power from the PS to the opposition in 2000 was largely 
the result of these processes of social and economic change, even if various triggers of a 
political nature also played a role.28 However, changes after the 2000 elections do not seem to 
have affected the perception that patrimonialism best describes Senegalese democracy. As 
Gellar (2005: 157) puts it: “Paradoxically, the 2000 presidential elections that established 
Senegal’s credentials as a full-fledged electoral democracy also led to a surge in mores typical 
of neopatrimonial regimes”. In other words, Wade’s regime may be more neopatrimonial than 
Senghor’s and Diouf’s. But does this explain the gradually shifting accumulation regime and 
the trends in the political economy of the country? Probably not. However, the declining 
enthusiasm over the benefits of electoral change have cast doubts over the value of Western-
type electoral democracy as a driver of change in a positive direction. Today, the deepening 
of electoral democracy in a context of economic liberalisation and increasing ‘spoils’ politics 
is making a myth of the alternance.29  
 
An important question remains as to whether, given the political settlement in the country and 
the degree of factionalism in claims over rents in a context of dwindling state resources, the 
state had the appropriate governance capabilities for a growth-enhancing strategy. In the last 
two decades, political fragmentation and the concomitant dispersion of power forced the 
Diouf regime to spread dwindling state resources too thin. Moreover, managing and 
redistributing aid flows proved harder than doing the same with agricultural surplus, as a 
result of the external conditionality framework and the increasing interference of donors in 
policy processes and outcomes. Finally, the convergence of interests between particular 
factions of rural and urban capitalist classes (dominated by merchant capital) and other 
‘conservative’ constituencies30, like religious leaders and rural petty-commodity producers, 
may also underlie the recent shift in the State’s discourse in favour of even more far-reaching 
liberalization, even if, as Boone (1992) correctly argues, this did not finally correspond to any 
coherent class-based political-economic project. Thus, against this background and the 
emerging contradictions between support of market liberalization and demands for protection, 
a progressively weakened State, lacking a consistent policy agenda, is unable to ‘nurture’ and 
‘discipline’ domestic capital.   
                                                     
28 Notably, the growing internal divisions within the ruling party in the 1990s, which, we would argue, 
also reflected the gradual dispersion of power centres and the shrinking of state resources to pay for 
political stability. 
29 Moreover, Wade’s mix of populism with economic liberalism seems to create more enemies than 
friends and its reliance on external finance to sustain a great deal of the major projects in which the 
state embarked is a source of vulnerability. 
30 Term used by Markovitz (1970) to denote the religious hierarchs.  
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Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to bring two fundamental elements into the discussion of political 
changes in Senegal since Independence. First, the nature and evolution of accumulation 
regimes and the role of the state and accumulation classes in their reproduction or exhaustion. 
Second, the nature and evolution of social class structures and their relationship with 
processes of socio-economic and political change. We have not dwelled on the particulars of 
political changes in Senegal and the evolution of Senegalese democracy. This has been dealt 
with extensively by a rich cluster of political and social scientists (Diop 2004; Cruise O’Brien 
2003; Gellar 2005).  
 
Instead, our emphasis has been placed on accumulation regimes concomitant with the uneven 
but gradual development of capitalism. There are important historical continuities in the sense 
that the accumulation regime of Senghor’s era in 1960-1980 built on the legacy of the 
colonial period, ideologically and administratively. This accumulation regime, based on 
surplus generated in the agricultural sector and on policies to promote the emergence of 
industrial capital, eventually waned in the 1970s as a result of a complex conjunction of 
factors, some external (drought, international market vagaries, etc.) and some certainly 
internal. The internal dynamics of state-capital relations and the ‘centralised bureaucratic 
politics’ solution to the ‘clientelist crisis’ of the pre- and early post-Independence period 
created some initial favourable conditions for more rapid capitalist accumulation via 
industrialisation and agricultural modernisation, but eventually Senghor’s regime failed to 
‘discipline’ capital in a way that was necessary to sustain such regime. Finally, the 
accumulation regime of the 1960s and 1970s collapsed as a result of inefficiencies and 
vulnerability at various levels, and the incapacity of the state to control the distribution of 
state resources and rents in a more effective manner. The fiscal and balance of payments 
crisis of the 1970s led to a change in the accumulation regime, associated with the recourse to 
foreign financing and the conditionality framework imposed to grant access to additional 
resources. 
 
The accumulation regime post-1980 exposed some critical vulnerabilities of the political 
economy of Senegal and exacerbated the weakness of the state in nurturing and disciplining 
domestic capital. Scarcer resources, existing rents and economic reforms in the 1980s and 
1990s created new spaces of accumulation and an unintended dispersion in centres of power, 
which would eventually have negative consequences for the survival of Diouf’s regime. 
Despite the odds, Diouf’s regime resisted for a long time, partly paradoxically as a result of 
power dispersion and lack of organised contestation and partly as a result of much improved 
access to aid flows and assistance from IFIs and bilateral donors. This enhanced foreign 
assistance unwillingly allowed the delay of some economic and administrative reforms and 
the maintenance of elements of the status quo for some time. However, this was at the cost of 
economic stagnation, increasing vulnerability, de-industrialisation, deepening agrarian crisis 
(especially the gradual but systematic decline of the ‘groundnut economy’) and growing 
urbanisation cum informalisation. The emergence of new classes (particularly in urban areas), 
class factions and centres of power, and the decline of the traditional political support from 
rural areas in a context of a weakened state eventually led to an exceptional electoral-based 
power change in 2000. 
 
In this article we have also put emphasis on the importance of carefully analysing existing 
social class structures, especially in rural areas, and their evolution in order to understand 
political change and the effects of different accumulation regimes on society and the 
economy, despite evident pervasiveness of forms of patrimonial politics. We have stressed the 
fact that patrimonial politics, per se, cannot explain political, economic and social changes in 
Senegal from the colonial period onwards and that a more careful understanding of political 
sequencing and its basic histories’, accumulation regimes and shifting class structures is a 
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necessary requirement. What matters is the way in which patrimonial practice sits in an 
overall regime of accumulation and the nature and unintended or intended consequences of 
patrimonial-based resource allocation on politics and social change (Khan 2006). 
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Statistical annex 
 
 
Figure 1. Capital accumulation in the long-term: saving and investment dynamics 
Savings and Investment dynamics: 1968-2004
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Table 1. Economic growth and main political-economic trends 
Period Economic 
growth 
rate 
Selected processes and trends 
1960-68 2.9% Post-independence expansion, Agricultural programme, industrial investments 
1968-73 0.2% Malaise paysan (agricultural crisis), drought, first oil-shock 
1973-76 2.2% Industrial expansion, government investments, high groundnut prices, higher 
inflation 
1976-79 0.0% Growing fiscal and current account deficits, exhaustion of ISI, debt defaults, 
public management crisis, end of agricultural programme 
1979-84 0.8% Second oil shock, higher inflation, disorganised agricultural sector, 
macroeconomic instability, large imbalances, beginning of fiscal austerity 
1984-90 2.1% Beginning of structural reforms, more aid inflows,  
1990-93 0.0% Post-elections instability, de-industrialisation, drought, export stagnation,  
1993-99 3.2% Post-devaluation and bolder liberalisation and privatisation, more aid flows, 
groundnut crisis but transitory export dynamism in chemicals (phosphates), fish 
and tourism 
1999-
2004 
2.2% Political change, growing public investments (infrastructure) with increasing aid 
flows, booming migrant remittances, construction bonanza, agricultural 
instability and continuing rural exodus 
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Figure 2. Migrant remittances trends 
Worker remittances (US$ millions, recorded)
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